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Georgia) 
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The Constitution of Georgia 
Article 35 
3. The state guarantees pre-school education. Primary education is mandatory for 
all. The state provides free primary education for all. Citizens have the right to free 
secondary, professional and tertiary education at state institutes within the 
framework and by the rules established in law. 
 
The generally accepted definition of corruption may be formulated as the abuse of 
pubic office for private gain.1 Whatever happens in Georgian public school system 
today does not entirely fit this or other “corruption” definitions. In reality we deal 
with some kind of shadow financing emerging as a result of conflict of interests 
between formally accepted ideas of organization and financing of school education 
and objective necessities of its development. 
 
On one hand Constitution of Georgia guarantees free school education for all, while 
on the other hand whatever resources undeveloped Georgian economy is able to 
provide are barely enough to slow down deterioration of the system.2 Under the 
circumstances the state for a while simply turned a blind eye to practice when schools 
were collecting money from parents in order to survive. Since this was a quite natural 
response to needs of cash starved school system, the authorities were unable to curb 
the process and had to legalize it. Still it was left virtually unregulated and 
uncontrolled, leaving a plenty of opportunity for corruption.  
 
 
Today majority of parents are to some extent contributing to school education of their 
children. Still Georgian authorities maintain a position that education is free under the 
pretext that this money is not applied to support the basic teaching program and 
                                                 
1 “Fighting Corruption Through Education”, Ellie Keen, COLPI Paper No.1, OSI, Budapest, p.18 
2  Basic education (grades 1-9) is formally free of charge for all. Grades 10-12 were paid for a while, 
but are planned to be free again commencing September 1, 2003-02-23 
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besides contributions are voluntary3. Although such distinction between free and paid 
tuition is rather fuzzy. 
 
Situation as such is rather dubious, to put it mildly. It already persisted for more than 
a decade leading to loss of majority of important features like efficiency, quality and 
equality. It resulted in frequent disruptions of classes, drove away the most qualified 
teachers and impoverished the vast majority of the remaining. Moreover - some 
experts and even officials in education field think (and I share their opinion) that 
public school system in Georgia is rapidly transforming from system providing 
general education for young generation into system mainly providing livelihood 
(however meagre) for people who work there. I strongly suspect that since such 
curious situation persists for already a decade anyone who is in charge of decision-
making in regard of school education is simply trying to procrastinate addressing this 
problem to the end of his/her personal term of service and then land it on the lap of 
the successor. So far such policy worked, problem is for how long it may continue 
unchanged. 
 
Under the circumstances sooner or later the authorities will have to clarify a status of 
school education, to mobilize enough resources (financial and material) of their own 
to stop deterioration of a public school system and restore it to the main function as 
education provider.  
 
There are still the additional factors at play that are pushing school education towards 
corrupt behaviour even without taking into consideration everything discussed above. 
 
Firstly, Georgia by a wide acclaim is a deeply corrupt country. Transparency 
International, corruption watchdog organization, in its recently published 2002 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) puts this country at 85th place among 102 nations 
under observation. CPI places Georgia among 20% of the most corrupt countries, well 
behind for instance Russia, Pakistan or Albania.4 This fact is formally acknowledged, 
mitigating measures all the way up to establishment of the formal anti-corruption 
agency are introduced, but actual results are close to nothing. Almost all deals in the 
country involving those of elected or executive officials, businesses or common 
citizens are based on some kind of personal “understanding” among the interested 
parties rather than on the law, which is routinely abused. Corrupt activities have 
already acquired a systemic character and it looks like that any government agency is 
becoming corrupt simply by default, by “virtue” of belonging to the system. As to the 
public school system it may be involved primarily due to controlling one of the largest 
public money flow in the country, especially that this is almost entirely disbursed as 
cash.  
 
Secondly. Public school system used to be itself one of the most corrupt systems in 
the country starting as far back as the beginning of 60-s of the last century. By that 
time quite a noticeable part of local population started to make enough additional 
money to invest it. Since investment opportunities under the Soviet system were close 
to zero, a higher education was one of the very few options available to people.  As 
access to a higher education was also strictly restricted, an informal system oriented at 
                                                 
3  The population dubbed contributions of this kind back in the USSR «forced-voluntary». 
4 The fact that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Moldova fair even worse than Georgia is of a little 
consolation for people who have to deal with corrupt situation here on a daily basis. 
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satisfaction of an excess demand under the market deficit conditions soon evolved. 
On a public school side it included intensive additional, out of school training in 4 
subjects included into university entry exams list, under the table trade for high marks 
in all other subjects. Naturally this spread throughout the whole school system and for 
many years it was mandatory at least for whose who pretended to achieve some kind 
of success (at least formal) to remunerate teachers in cash or in kind, or influence 
them through some kind of informal contacts. In the end almost universally 
graduation with high grades depended on “understanding” between teachers, school 
administration and interested parents.5 Today this system is largely defunct mainly 
due to a drastically reduced purchase power of the overwhelming majority of 
population. 6 Still traditions persist and these corrupt practices may emerge and are 
emerging any time opportunity presents itself. 
 
Bearing all above mentioned in mind the most important for me was to look for 
answers to the following questions: 
 
• Do Georgian authorities have enough financial resources at their disposal to 
stop deterioration of a public school system and to restore it at least to a status 
it enjoyed during the last years of the USSR? 
• Are there enough financial and managerial resources in the public school 
system that might be utilized through cost cutting and efficiency measures? 
• Does the system have to turn to alternative sources of financing in order to 
solve problems it faces today? 
• What external factors affecting system development may endow do corruption 
in public schools? 
• What is a popular perception of problems of public school development, with 
special emphasis on parents’ endowment to education as well as school 
corruption problems? 
 
In order to find answers to above questions I analyzed a general system of allocation 
of public finances in Georgia and especially financial relations among different levels 
of government inside the country (namely a system of transfers). I also tried to 
identify the key players in the education budgeting process and their role in the sector. 
Organization and managerial practices of public school system was also analyzed. 
Public opinion poll was carried out in November-December 2002 covering 
approximately 10% of Georgian schools.7 
 
Results of final analysis are presented here as follows: 
                                                 
5 That did not mean though that you could be a total moron and receive a good certificate. At least in 
core subjects students were trained properly, but this again happened thanks to additional paid tuition. 
6 Besides there are so many higher education institutions in Georgia that they are fighting tooth and 
claw to capture anyone who is able to pay for their services and applicant’s qualification is not a key 
determinant of hiring any more. 
7 Sources of information in these paper besides the public opinion poll are as follows – for general 
socio-economic development trends –State Department of Statistics of Georgia (SDS), all formal 
documents on education – Ministry of Education (MoE), financial data – Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
basic public school system data - The WB Georgian Education System Realignment and Strengthening 
Project, SDS.  
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1. Despite some obvious progress general results of post-Soviet transformation in 
Georgia are disappointing. GDP in 2002 amounted to just about 43% of its 1990 level. 
Or it took the country’s economy ten years to grow back to the average level of 1992-
93 – the worst years in the modern Georgian history. Besides use 1990 GDP level as a 
benchmark is of a very doubtful virtue. That year the USSR was agonizing, its 
economy was in shambles and supported only by oil exports and huge western credits. 
Thus to say that performance of Georgian economy is unsatisfactory as compared to 
the last year of the USSR means that it’s in the very sad state indeed.  
 
The real amount of GDP is also extremely small. It reached just $ 3321,9 million in 
2002.8 Of this sum at least 1/3 belonged to “shadow” sector, thus leaving Georgian 
authorities with very little money to be incorporated into a budget.  
 
 
 
Chart 1. Education dynamics versus GDP, years 1990-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Department of Statistics of Georgia (SDS) 
 
“Thanks” to omnipresent corruption, low fiscal discipline, persisting over optimistic 
budget planning and other similar factors the real amount of finances incorporated 
into the budget is much lower than in any developed country. Consolidated budget 
revenues (central state budget plus local budgets, plus special funds’ budgets) 
amounted in 2001 to $ 495 mill or just 15.4% of GDP.9 According to local experts 
under the current conditions Georgia theoretically may increase this share to about a 
quarter of GDP, but in reality it may hardly go beyond 18%.  
 
Share of education in GDP was about 56% of its 1990 level reaching 3.9 % in 2002. 
This is rather low as compared to OECD average of 5.8% or CIS average of 4.6%, 
                                                 
8 Just a little reminder – managers of WorldCom misappropriated at least $3.8 billion.   
9 Total budget expenditures amounted to app. $ 607.9 mill. Among not the largest American 
universities I had a first hand experience, Boston University had operating budget of about $ 900 mill, 
University of Georgia (Athens) – 1.2 billion. 
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although is at the same level as developing countries’ average. Although sector 
recovery looks more impressive than this of GDP it is not obviously good enough. 
During the same period number of students reduced by just about ¼.10  
 
Consolidated budget expenses on education amounted to about $ 79.4 mill in 2001 or 
13.1% of the total budget expenditures.11 This sector is in no way discriminated; quite 
on the contrary education is one of the largest consumer of the budget money its 
allocations exceeding that of Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as all security 
agencies combined. On the other hand it amounted to 24% of budget expenditures in 
1991, or 1.84 times more. 
 
If measured against GDP the state budget education spending share dropped from 7% 
in 1991 to just 2.5% (although it recovered from 1% in 1994). Public schools 
consumed just under half of these expenditures, or less than $ 40 mill per year. 
Considering that through persisting efforts Georgian authorities managed to preserve 
almost all school infrastructure intact and enrolment at least in grades 1-9 close to 
90%, this amount of money was applied to more than 3100 schools with about 680 
thousand students.12 
 
This also means that the state is able to allocate less than $ 60 per student per year, or 
approximately $ 200-220 if we apply PPP. Of course it bears no comparison with any 
of OECD countries and is considerably less than in India or Indonesia for instance. 
The same picture emerges if we compare per student spending with GDP per capita. 
In 2001 it reached just below 9% of the latter figure.13 The OECD average is 25%. 14 
 
One of the major (if not the decisive) problems of the public school system is that no 
one is able to say what amount of financing it really needs. There are too few formal 
rules and standards guiding organization and management of public school system in 
Georgia, and those in use have too many loopholes and irregularities to be applied 
properly. Many day-by-day decisions are made based on the old Soviet standards 
(often even not formally reapplied by new authorities) or even by traditional 
understanding of problems at hand with all the pending consequences. This situation 
has become so awkward that Georgian parliament twice during the recent years (2001 
and 2002) through budget law obliged Ministry of Education (MoE) to develop 
                                                 
10 Total number of students of all types of educational institutions in Georgia reduced from 1267,2 
thousand in 1990 to 950,1 thousand in 2002. Of this, number of public school students reduced from 
878,2 thousand to 668,5. First reduction by app. 168,1 thousand or 19% took place in 1990-1993 due to 
secession of part of Georgian territory and corresponding civil strife. Second large reduction took place 
after 1997 when this number dropped by 53,3 thousand of whose 15,4 thousand moved to private 
schools. 
11 Figures of 2002 were not available at time of writing this report. 
12 Data used to characterize Georgian education as well as finances in general is rather unreliable and 
should be used with caution, mostly to define general trends. 
13 Actually it may be much less since SDS uses circa 4.5 mill as amount of Georgian population. As 
very preliminary information about 2002 census suggests this number may be closer to 4.2-4.3 mill. 
14 The most important consequence of such under financing is that the sector has no resources for 
maintenance and development. Repair of school buildings, outfitting them with computers, etc. are 
almost exclusively result of intervention of international donors or some wealthy Georgians. On 
average sector disburses about 90% of all budget allocations to personnel remuneration. This process is 
gone so far that the authorities are simply including schools into agenda of foreign dignitaries’ visits 
and than asking them for contribution. For instance during his 2002 visit the president of Romania 
pledged to finance repair of  #166 secondary school in Tbilisi. 
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educational standards (including financial) by May 1 of an ongoing fiscal year. In 
both cases the ministry ignored this decision without any consequences.  
 
The reluctance of MoE as well as the Ministry of Finance to comply with the law is 
quite well understandable. To develop such standards (especially financial based on 
per student expenditures) during the requested period is technically very difficult, if 
possible at all. Besides associated political risks are too high. Introducing for instance 
per student financial allocation standard may actually show the real extent of under 
financing of public school system with all the consecutive indignation and wrath of 
public and political opposition falling on the heads of whose who will dare introduce 
them.15 As a result MoE is currently “planning to start introductory measures in order 
to develop per student allocation standards” through the World Bank Georgian 
Education System Realignment and Strengthening Program. How many years that 
may take one can only guess. 
 
The only legally binding norm on the subject concerns teachers’ salaries and was 
developed back in 1998, legalized through the Presidential decree. Teachers are to be 
paid uniformly throughout the country, save for mountainous areas where they have 
to be paid to the extent of 1.2 to 1.4 of standard salaries depending on the altitude of 
the school location.16 During 1997-1999 were was an attempt to introduce a 
certification of teachers into 4 categories, but due to all too visible irregularities (to 
put it mildly) in this process it was abandoned. Still the teachers who have already 
earned their grades retained them and salaries were also defined in accordance with 
these grades. These were as follows: 
 
Higher category - 70 Lari 
1st category - 52.5 
2nd category – 45.50 
3rd category – 38.50 
No category – 36 Lari 
 
The average salary for Georgia, taking into account the actual distribution of teachers 
by categories could thus be 46.8 Lari. By 2001 this sum deteriorated to the extent that 
it comprised just a little bit more than $ 20 per month or less than $1 per day that is an 
absolute poverty level by the WB definition. This was much less than average salary 
level in Georgia and about 2.5 times less than minimum subsistence level. Relative to 
GDP per capita this salary reached just 38,8% while for instance in Hungary the 
appropriate rate was 82,0%.17 
 
Besides more often than not such salary was and is paid in arrears. Under the 
circumstances it is easy to understand that majority of teachers are working according 
                                                 
15 It’s not only the Georgian problem. For instance Polish Minister for Education failed under the same 
circumstances. See Jan Herczynski, CASE Foundation Warsaw, The Financing of Georgian Education. 
16 These coefficients were not applied on practice and the parliament demanded to do this in the current 
fiscal year. Whether this is implemented remains to be seen. 
17 See: Eva Balasz, Zoltan Hermann Education Management and Finance in Hungary. Efficiency, 
Equity and Quality Problems in the Transition Period. In: Balancing National and Local 
Responsibilities. Education Management and Finance in Four Central European Countries. Edited by 
Kenneth Davey, Budapest, 2002. p. 104. 
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to the old popular Soviet formula – “the government pretends that it pay teachers and 
teachers pretend that they work”.   
 
In the end Georgian authorities had to increase salaries summarily by 30% 
commencing September 1, 2002. This means that today the average salary should be 
60.8 Lari or something about $ 28 by the exchange course of December 2002, i.e. still 
less than $1 per day.18 Besides year to year inflation rate from mid 1998 to mid-2002 
according to the State Department of Statistics reached 37% meaning again that this 
increase did not even compensate the loses that took place after 1998. Only the higher 
category teachers (about 7% of all) are formally entitled to more than $1 per day 
before taxes and less than that after progressive income tax is applied. 
 
Since teachers’ salaries are the only formally defined index of public school finances, 
I made attempt to calculate just about what amount of money the school education 
sector might need if salary of “no category” teacher equals a minimum subsistence 
level (after taxes). These calculations were based on data of 2001 since no final 
results of fiscal year 2002 were available.  
 
This minimum subsistence level was taken as 105 Lari/month. To receive this sum 
after taxes the average monthly salary throughout the year should not be less than 135 
Lari. Average teacher’s salary recalculated by distribution of teachers by categories 
could reach 175 Lari (about $80). This sum is rather close to one that school 
principals named as desirable one  - 190 Lari during the public opinion poll. 
 
I calculated two sets of data based on assumptions that sums allocated to 
remuneration (salaries proper plus obligatory employers’ contribution) in the first case 
should comprise 90% of all public school spending (as it is today) and not exceed half 
of a budget (just about as in Eastern Europe) in the second case.19  
 
The first set of calculations may be considered as a “worst case scenario” since its 
rather unrealistic to presume that school system may endure as a functioning 
mechanism for years to come without virtually any investments into maintenance and 
development. Still presuming that such situation may continue for some time into the 
future, the system needs at least 2,4 times more financing than in 2001 in order to 
pay teachers the minimum salary equal to a subsistence level of 2001. Depending on 
regions that may change from 2 to 3 times. 
 
In second case, the desirable one, average financing may rise by about 4.4 times, from 
3.7 to 5.8 times depending on the region. 
 
                                                 
18 I wrote, “Should be” because no document defining exact amount of teachers’ salaries after increase 
have been adopted. 
19 I did not take into consideration remuneration of school principals and other non-teaching staff, as 
well as coefficients applied to mountainous areas. That would have complicated calculations to a great 
extent without really altering the general trends. 
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In the first case the state should allocate to a public school about 3% of 2001 GDP, in 
the second – about 5.4%. I.e. in order to stabilize the system and allow for its recovery 
it should receive additional $60-130 million per year.20  
 
How realistic are these kind of public school development scenarios? Taking into 
account purely financial considerations, at least the first scenario may be achievable, 
if authorities make public school the development priority. GDP growth during 2001-
2002 comprised $123.4 million. Provided that this level of growth can be sustained 
for a while investing an additional $60 mill into school system looks rather realistic.  
 
On the other hand, taking into account the current economic and political realities the 
both scenarios look too far fetching. Considering the state of the local economy and 
existing development forecasts such levels of school education financing cannot be 
realistically achieved in a short to medium run. So far country’s economic 
performance was erratic at best. In a course of just five years (1997-2002) the annual 
growth rate deviated between 11 to 2 to 5%. The general state of the economy may 
characterized as “stably critical”, meaning that not even the absolute minimum of 
efforts were undertaken to overcome the post-Soviet crisis. Country needs double-
digit growth figures to improve its standing in the years to come, but the current 
administration can hardly claim that it has either system of development priorities or 
any definite development objectives. More often than not one is left with impression 
that the corruption is the only driving force behind governments’ efforts and if any 
actual changes take place here that is only under the pressure of various international 
donors. But tolerance of these donors is obviously running thin and as recently as 
January 2003 the WB refused to disburse the already planned $40 mill credit citing 
corruption as one of the prime reasons behind such decision. 
 
Local experts whom I consulted deny that any positive macroeconomic development 
is possible under the current administration. Under the most optimistic development 
scenario it may be totally overhauled as a result of forthcoming parliamentary and 
presidential elections. When it may take a couple of years until new administration 
grips power firmly enough to make efficient, positive changes in macroeconomic 
policy. I.e. under the very best of circumstances Georgian budget may become large 
enough to allocate sums like discussed above to a public school system some time at 
the end of next decade.  
 
2. One of the main objectives of my research was to understand how the main actors 
in the public school system perceive problems this system currently faces. Namely I 
wanted to understand to what extent various additional funding is characterizing the 
system and if such financing may be perceived as corrupting. In order to do this 
roughly 10% of schools (301 altogether) in each of 11 Georgian regions were 
targeted.21 Poll, conducted in November-December 2002, was based on idea of setting 
each school principal against two parents of students of the same school in order to 
get the opinion from the both sides of division line. As a result roughly half of 
questions of both principal’s and parents’ questionnaires were similar. Answers for 
both principals and parents were grouped by Western and Eastern Georgia and Tbilisi, 
                                                 
20 This calculation more or less corresponds to other calculations of that kind. For instance the chief 
financial officer of Tbilisi department of education considers that school sector here needs at least 3 
times more budget allocation than today while aiming at teachers’ remuneration of about $ 1 per day. 
21 Formally there are 12 regions but Abkhazia is outside the control of Georgian government.  
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each part comprising roughly one third of country’s population. In general both 
principals and parents in Eastern Georgia were more pessimistic in their answers than 
others and principals, as public employees tended to give more “loyal” answers.  
 
Results of survey are presented here as follows: 
 
• As to general trends of development, exactly 60% of parents answered that 
Georgia generally moved in wrong direction since regaining independence in 
1991, while opinion of principals was divided – roughly 47% approved whatever 
happened in this country while app. 43% disapproved it.22 Overwhelming majority 
of all respondents (83% of parents and 88% of principals) considered school 
education as one of the leading development priorities and put it at 2d place 
among 10 such priorities. 
• Asked about what happened to a public school system during last 12 years 
roughly 60% of parents and 47% of principals answered that its state deteriorated, 
while 26 and 41% said that it improved a little. Such positive perception of school 
development was especially well pronounced in Tbilisi where 33% of parents and 
58% of principals answered that schools are better off today than they used to be 
back in 1990. The same trend is observed in the following questions as well – the 
overwhelming majority 81% of parents and 85% of principals said that state of 
public school system either improved or remained unchanged during 2002. 82% 
of parents and 87% of principals said that state of their particular school either 
improved or remained unchanged as well. Even more – 72% of parents and 87% 
of principals evaluated general state of their particular school as good to very 
good and only 20 and 10% correspondingly rated it as bad to a very bad.23 
Organization of classes – 85% of parents from good to a very good and only app. 
11% from bad to a very bad. These answers were 97 and 2% among principals. 
General qualification of teachers – 92% of parents and 97% of principals rated it 
as good to a very good. Only asked about state of school buildings and 
equipment both parents and principals were a little bit more pessimistic – 42% of 
parents and 57% of principals evaluated it as good to a very good, while 39 and 
42% said it was bad to a very bad. 24 Such situation looks rather illogical for 
everyone with a good knowledge of the local school system and calls for a little 
comment. It’s obvious that principals, from sense of loyalty towards the state they 
serve or by some other considerations try to evade negative valuation of a 
situation as much as it is possible. As to parents, these people were through very 
rough times since 1990, general condition, living standards and incomes of their 
overwhelming majority deteriorating to huge extent. They almost came to terms to 
living under the most adverse conditions, without electricity, natural gas, water 
supply for a major part of the year (especially outside the capital). Often they have 
no proper income. It will be unfair to say that their conditions continue to 
deteriorate, but they are not really improving as well. During all these years they 
observed as almost whole social infrastructure crumbled down and only public 
school system looks rather intact and functioning. No wonder that their perception 
                                                 
22 If these numbers do not make up 100% this is because the share of those who had no answer is not 
included in this text. 
23 Only in Eastern Georgia app. 33% of parents and 18% of principals rated state of their schools as bad 
to a very bad.  
24 Eastern Georgia is the exception again – 64% of parents 63% of principals rated it as bad to a very 
bad. 
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of the system rather exaggerates its actual state – classes are not disturbed very 
often, teachers are conducting lessons, students are tested – these means that 
school is functioning rather well. Never mind for instance that no one remembers 
when experiments in chemistry or physics were conducted the last time or new 
maps for geography lessons were bought, schools are still doing better than 
everything else in the country. Besides almost no one remembers the time when 
school system was up to some acceptable standards-it was too long ago. They also 
have no better example to compare – private schools still provide no better 
schooling compared to the good public schools and there is no qualitative 
evaluation of the current state of public schools to tell parents to what extent it has 
deteriorated. No wonder that they exaggerate the state of the school system. 
• Asked to evaluate the rate of teachers’ salaries both parents (80%) and principals 
(86%) evaluated it as a low. In general school principals consider the minimum 
full time teacher’s salary should be about 191 Lari (app. $ 90) per month on 
average in Georgia, about 3 times more than today. In Tbilisi this number tends to 
be more like 250 Lari, which is natural considering the differences in the cost of 
living. Asked to what extent budget allocations satisfy current needs of their 
particular school, principals on average answered – 33%.25 Also contrary to the 
most wide spread opinion, almost 46% of principals answered that these 
allocations were disbursed in a regular way, while app. half of them answered that 
it was done rather to very irregularly. Western Georgia seems to get this money in 
the most regular way, since 63% of respondents said so, while in Eastern Georgia 
the situation almost mirrors it – 64% of money was allocated irregularly. Almost 
in 70% of cases if money was delayed it was for less than 3 months, including 
46% that was late for less than 1 month. Cases than money is delayed for a really 
long time are rather rare except for (rather strangely) Western Georgia where in 
more than a quarter of cases it’s late for 9 months and more. It looks like that 
although disbursement of funds to schools is rather far from regular, it is not as 
drastic as is usually perceived, and the worst cases are restricted to few localities. 
Otherwise we should assume that principals are lying en mass, which is possible 
but rather improbable. 
• Article 2.3 of Georgian education law states rather interestingly that any 
educational institution in order to attract money to school and manage it in a 
rational way has right to establish a school board. Functions and mode of 
conduct of such board are to be determined by schools themselves, i.e. 
considering the Georgian realities by principals and may be the couple of their 
closest associates. Considering again the current Georgian realities it is factually 
an invitation to open up almost totally uncontrolled money source associated with 
its corrupt mishandling. Besides whatever education authorities say on the subject 
and the actual amount of money charged, for whose parents who pay, education of 
their children is not free of charge any more. Asked if they knew about such 
provision 89% of principals throughout the Georgia gave the positive answer, 
while only 42% of parents were aware of it (only 28% in Eastern Georgia).  About 
65% of parents and 59% of principals (rather close association) answered that 
money was collected in their particular school. Quite naturally the highest rate of 
school involvement in such practice was observed in the capital (88% according to 
                                                 
25 App. 24% of principals in Eastern Georgia answered that these allocations were totally 
unsatisfactory, a fact that reveals their more their deep dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, 
rather than the real extent of a public school financing. 
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parents and 82% according to principals), followed by Eastern Georgia (app. 
70%) and Western Georgia, where 62% of principals and 49% of parents said that 
no money was collected in their schools. On the other hand the rate of collection 
by schools seems to be rather high. 90% of parents in schools where it was 
collected throughout Georgia answered that they personally contributed. But 
asked what part of parents to their opinion contributed, principals answered 49%, 
parents 57.26 
• Very interesting are answers to question – in whose name this money was 
collected and who manages it? Only about 17% of parents throughout Georgia 
answered that it was collected in the name of school boards, 44% answered that it 
was collected by parents and teachers associations (PTA) and the remaining by 
either school principal or teachers councils. On the contrary 31% of principals 
answered that this money was managed by school boards, 48% by PTA and only 
very minor part by principals or teachers councils. Rather interestingly parents’ 
and principals’ answers come very close throughout Georgia as regards PTAs, but 
whatever the merits of such establishment this is not the one which is entitled to 
collect and manage funds by law. But at least it can be legalized, while all other 
“collectors and managers” are doing this absolutely out of any legal bounds. 
Besides only about 44% of establishments that can be legalized on principle 
(school boards, teachers and parents associations) have any legal status – usually 
as NGOs. The highest rate of legalization was naturally observed in Tbilisi – app. 
68%, about 34% in Eastern and 24% in Western Georgia. Answers as those 
bespeak the total chaos and absence of law associated with the system of 
attracting private funds to public schools. Usually this process depends entirely on 
a good will and moral values of a particular school principal. Asked if they can 
actually control money collected by their particular school quite unexpectedly 
more than a half (52%) of parents throughout Georgia answered “yes”. On the 
other hand in Tbilisi where the major part of money is obviously collected 51% of 
parents answered that they could not control it and only 42% answered that they 
could. I prefer to conduct personally interviews with parents of students of the 
most popular and the “richest” schools in Tbilisi (where monthly fee is sometimes 
$50 per month) and in these cases answers were definitely “no” - they could not 
control use of money they pay. Still even in Tbilisi 63% of parents answered that 
they paid money voluntarily (77% both in Eastern and Western Georgia). 
• These “donations” are usually collected on a monthly basis and on the average 
they are about $1 (1,8 Lari according to principals and 2,4 Lari according to 
parents).27 But they naturally show plenty of geographical difference. 86% of 
parents in Eastern and 85% in Western Georgia said that they paid less than app. 
$0,9 per month, including 70 and 69% who paid less than $0,5. On average 
parents evaluated their personal contribution per child during 2001-2002 academic 
year as about $ 8. Even for impoverished Georgia such amount of money paid on 
the monthly basis may cause problems only for the poorest families with many 
children, but such people simply do not pay. Does it do any good to schools? 81% 
of principals and 78% of parents said that it improves school functioning just a 
                                                 
26 Such school “endowments” are neither local invention nor purely Georgian phenomenon.  It was 
rather wide spread throughout the USSR and still persists today. For instance according to the most 
recent Russian poll 80% of local parents are endowing to school needs and 90% are making presents to 
teachers (http://www.newsru.com, April 18, 2003).  
27 At least I hope they are since about 40% of both parents and principals refused to answer this 
question. 
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little bit. 75% of parents throughout Georgia answered that they know what this 
money is used for (only 63% in Tbilisi), in about 90% of cases this being school 
maintenance and day by day repair. I.e. one can sweep floors, change 
windowpanes or repair leaking taps only using money provided by parents. That 
makes quite unusual distribution of labor in Georgian public school system – the 
state is in charge of teachers’ salaries, parents and other donors (these one if and 
when) of everything else. Still average monthly amount of such donations per 
school is rather small – about $160 throughout Georgia, although it is naturally 
much higher in Tbilisi with its larger schools, while outside the capital more than 
75% of schools collected less than $100. If one tries to calculate (rather 
approximately of course) what amount of money may circulate in a public school 
system as a result of parents’ contributions, depending whether this is done on per 
student or per school basis, the answer is app. $ 220-300 thousand. This makes up 
about 5-7% of the formal annual public school expenses.  
• Providing paid instructions above education standard in basic school subjects is 
the only absolutely legal and well-regulated way to attract additional money into a 
public school system in Georgia (Order # 214 of May 27, 1996 by MoE, 
paragraph 8). Major part of earned money should be used to additional 
remuneration. Amount of such additional remuneration was to be decided by 
schools depending on teaching loads. Hours devoted to such training (2-3 per 
week per class on average) are officially included into academic programs. 
Problem with such training is that it’s impossible to determine where a real 
necessity for additional training ends and schools start to use these classes purely 
as a pretext to extort extra money from parents. Besides almost no-one (as usual in 
this country) pays attention to the formal limitations to amount of such training 
and tries to maximize number of extra-curricular classes per week. Here for the 
first time principals and parents provided very different answers to question, 
whether such practice existed in their particular school. On average in Georgia 
23% of parents and just 15% of principals provided positive answer, in Tbilisi that 
was 40 and 27%, in Eastern Georgia – 24 and 12% (!) and 13 and 9% in Western 
Georgia. Situation as such is rather peculiar, since it’s hard to understand why 
school principals try to deny existence of absolutely legal practice in their schools, 
unless it is being turned into something very different from whatever MoE had in 
mind allowing these additional classes. I personally conducted survey of one the 
oldest and quite popular schools in Tbilisi and here the deputy principal, women 
I’m well acquainted with for many years, strictly denied that such practice existed 
in this school, while the school possessed a well developed system of above the 
standard instructions and she was well aware that I naturally knew that. Still 
whatever the actual character of such practices, contrary to a rather wide spread 
opinion  (including opinion of MoE officials) except for the capital, it does not 
look quite popular even in schools where it exists according to parents. Only 33% 
of parents said that their children were actually engaged in these instructions on 
average in Georgia, including 26% in Tbilisi, 30% in Eastern and 51% (rather 
strangely) in Western Georgia. That means that just about 7% of all public school 
students in Georgia were engaged in above the standard instructions.28 Amount of 
money paid for such instructions also varied to a great extent, although the basic 
sum was about 5-10 Lari per month per course - about 28% of students in Tbilisi 
                                                 
28 According to principals the picture was again absolutely different. In Tbilisi share of participating 
students was about 40%, in Eastern Georgia – 25% and 18% in Western, but overall amount of students 
engaged in above the standard instruction is very low here too. 
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paid that, 46% in Eastern and 58% in Western Georgia. But again the real amount 
of students engaged in this process is very low and in general it may be classified 
as a rather unsuccessful attempt to provide school with a legal pretext to get the 
additional money from parents. It basically failed, mainly because there is a little 
practical sense in such classes (except for may be foreign languages) and besides 
there is simply not enough money among parents to afford such “luxury”. There 
are parents who claim to pay more than 200-300 Lari per academic year for these 
instructions. Still such practice calls for a real attention since a rather peculiar 
reaction of school principals to a quite harmless question regarding such practices 
may lead to a speculation as about how clean and harmless they actually are. On 
the other hand teachers can legally earn quite substantial (by the local standards) 
additional money this way. Some most successful teachers are earning 4-5 extra 
salaries, but these are the rare exceptions. 
• Asked, if besides all more or less legal means of attracting additional funding to 
schools, teachers are “rewarded” in person by parents for services provided 
above and beyond their formal duties, 84% of parents and 91% of school 
principals answered “no”. For anyone who is well acquainted with Georgian 
school system the answer is rather unexpected since such practice is very deep 
rooted in the local traditions for decades and is restricted today only by obvious 
insolvency of major part of parents. Some parents even said during the survey – 
“Yes, we remunerate teachers in cash or in kind, but we consider such practice 
correct and will not let you condemn it. Thus to your question we answer – no”. 
One of school principals told me – “The other day we held teachers-parents 
conference at school. Majority of parents came with bulging bags. When they left 
their bags were either empty, or missing. What was in that bags or what happened 
to it I do not know and can not comment”. 
• Asked if attracting extra budget funds to schools is necessary for functioning of 
a public schools system, 49% of parents answered “yes”, while 35% were against 
such practice, on the contrary 78% of principals support such practice. Question 
whether such practice may cause corruption in schools led to a sharp division in 
opinions (see Chart 2).  While principals overwhelmingly deny this idea, parents 
were obviously in two   minds and find it hard to answer this   question.  This   is  
 
Chart 2. May Private Contributions be a Cause of Corruption in Schools? 
 
 
 
Source: Public opinion poll 
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     especially well pronounced in Western Georgia where difference between 
positive and negative answers was just 1%. Only in Tbilisi where such 
practices are the most widespread 42% of parents against 30% said that they 
lead to corruption. Asked if public school system may be considered corrupt, 
only 24% of parents throughout Georgia gave a positive answer and 49% 
negative.29 And again situation was quite different in the capital where 31,2% 
of parents answered “yes” and 31,9% - “no”. It looks like that in general 
practices of attracting additional money to schools and all associated problems 
are mainly restricted to the capital and few other leading urban centers where 
the money is.  
• Principals and parents again express rather opposite opinions answering the 
question whether attracting additional money means factually introduction 
of the paid education into public school system. 44% of parents throughout 
Georgia said “yes” to this question and 35% “no” (49 and 29% in Tbilisi), 
while for principals these answers were 24 and 66% (see Chart 3). On the 
other hand both  
 
Chart 3. Do You Think That Paid Education Should be Introduced Into Public 
School? 
 
 
 
Source: Public opinion poll 
 
      parents (60%) and principals (74%) agree that such practice should be 
formally acknowledged. Both parents and principals consider that 
introduction of a paid       education model in public school may only 
partially solve its problems (see Chart 4). Throughout Georgia 49% of parents 
answered, “yes, this can partly solve public school problems” and 50% “no, it 
can not”. Unexpectedly 58% of principals answered that paid education can 
partly solve public school problems, 7% answered that this may solve these 
problems completely and only 35% did not see advantages of paid education. 
And as usual, trends towards introduction of paid education are more 
pronounced in Tbilisi – here 75% of principals and 65% of parents believe that 
                                                 
29 I did not ask school principals this question. 
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payment may solve public school problems. This is interesting that in a 
country with long-standing traditions of free education majority of respondents 
do not reject idea of introducing some kind of payment into state public 
schools. Parents and principals opinion outside the capital also came rather 
close answering the question what amount per students/per month should 
parents be charged in order to solve problems of their particular school. 
Almost 9/10 of parents and more than 70% of principals see this amount as 
about 25 Lari. On the other hand in Tbilisi a quarter of parents see this 
exceeding 26 Lari, while 69% of principals want it exceed 26 Lari, including 
26% of whose who see this exceeding 51 Lari per month (average teacher’s 
salary is 60,8 Lari).  
• Asked about reasons of possible corruption in a public school system parents 
throughout Georgia provided a number of alternative reasons, although low 
level of teachers’ remuneration remained the leading one (70%), followed by 
presence of general corrupt situation in the country (15%), low moral 
properties of teachers (10%) and absence of control (5%). Interestingly only 
respondents in Eastern Georgia talk about moral properties of school 
personnel (25% of all respondents here), while only respondents in the capital 
pay attention to absence of control (33,3%).  On a country level principals 
gave virtually the same answers as parents. On the local level this picture 
looks quite different, especially again in the capital. Only 56% of principals 
here, versus 67% of parents said that a low level of teachers’ remuneration 
was the leading reason of corruption in school, while one third of principals 
pinpointed moral properties of school personnel among its leading causes.  
 
 
Chart 4. Do You Think That Paid Education May Solve Public School 
Problems? 
 
ource: Public opinion poll 
 Overwhelming majority of parents (89%) and principals (76%) support the idea 
S
 
 
•
that model of paid education should be flexible and allow each school introduce 
paid classes alongside the free of charge, or introduce paid education where it 
considers it possible. School principals were also asked if they consider social 
cost of (hypothetical) shift to paid model of school education unjustifiably high 
even if the very existence of public school system depended on this. Almost ¼ of 
all respondents find it difficult to answer this question, while 40% consider it 
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high, versus 36% who think this as acceptable option. Again there are strong local 
differences showing mainly that those who are the least committed to attracting 
additional money for school functioning today (Western Georgia) are less afraid 
to introduce some kind of paid education. 
 
o you consider social cost of shift to paid model of school education unjustifiably 
 
bilisi  Eastern Georgia Western Georgia 
 
es   45,6%  50,0%   30,3%  
o   26,3%  22,6%   51,4% 
o answer  28,1%  27,4%   18,3% 
. Analysis made above show that chances of radical improvements in school 
o existing procedures if 
 
y constitution Georgia is a federal country, incorporating two autonomous republics 
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education on expense of positive macroeconomic development are infinitesimal. Thus 
stabilization and may be some kind of positive development may be achieved either 
by redistribution of existing resources within the system or attracting private finances, 
i.e. radically changing status of the system.30 Questions are:  
• How efficiently are finances allocated today? And  
• Is it possible to introduce radical changes int
necessary? 
B
Abkhazia and Adjara. First is currently outside the Georgian control, although retains 
some kind of government in exile and associated structures, including schools. Adjara 
is semi-independent in effect, to the extent that it for number of years refuses to 
transfer taxes collected on its territory into the central budget.31 By law local 
governments (58 districts, 2 autonomous republics and the capital Tbilisi) are in 
charge of financing public schools.32 For this they have two sources of income – local 
taxes and other local revenues and central budget transfers. Transfers play a key role  
in financing school education for vast majority of local governments and amount to
about 40% of all local education expenses. Of 58 local governments under 
consideration only 10 did not use transfers in 2001 (including Adjara autonomy and 
Tbilisi).33  
 
 
30 This second option, as it is today was considered above.  
 
31 One of the major consequences of this was that it managed almost double teachers’ salaries in 2001. 
32 They are also obliged to finance pre-school institutions, some specialized schools. Some money is 
also allocated to vocational education, schools for handicapped children and some higher education 
institutions, although public school expenditures exceed 2/5 of all local educational spending. 
 
33 A fact that local government is able to support schools without support from a central budget does 
not mean that it’s doing it better. General conditions of school education vary too much less extent than 
one may imagine. 
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Of remaining 51 in 45 transfers covered more than 50% of education financing while 
ot only majority of local schools are heavily depended on central budget transfers. 
hart 5. Role of Transfer in Region Expenditures, Year 2002 
in 17 it exceeded 85-90% of education budget often approaching 100%. It is 
important to notice that Ministry of Finances in recent years fulfils transfer 
obligations by 100% making them the only guaranteed source of local education 
financing. Virtually all local budgets are too weak to fulfil they obligations in total 
and are generating arrears, especially salaries, sometimes dating back to 1998. As to 
end of December 2002 salary arrears were approaching $9 mill of which 72% came to 
just 18 districts, sometimes exceeding total annual teachers’ salaries (this coincides 
with conclusions of survey which also indicated that problem of arrears is mainly 
limited to restricted number of districts). Only 11 territorial units did not have these 
arrears, including the capital and Adjara autonomy. Again as was reflected in the 
public opinion polls 76% of these arrears came to Western Georgia (excluding 
Adjara). 
 
N
Education transfers also amount to a lion’s share of all transfers disbursed to local 
governments, while education more often than not represents a single largest item of 
budget expenditures. In 20 districts education amounted to 100% of transfers while in 
all others it was not less than 80-90%. In 40 districts education expenditures exceeded 
50% of all local expenditures and only in Tbilisi it reached just about 20% of total.34  
Although in majority of districts transfers do not exceed 30-40% of total expenditures, 
their actual role in local finances is unjustifiably high stemming again from the fact 
that these are the only guaranteed spending items. This again makes education sector 
the most important one for local budgets – first   because almost all transfers come to 
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34 I use very approximate percentages and word “about” all too often because quality of information 
provided by Ministry of Finance is such that two officials sitting vis-à-vis each other may provide 
basically different data on the same subject. 
 18
 
education; second – almost all these transfers consist of salaries that belong to so 
alled “protected” items and cannot be sequestered, providing districts with badly 
etween officials of Ministry of Finance and local government with all pending 
, year 2001 
c
needed cash, third – considering the current state of relations between a federal and 
local governments actual spending of this money is almost totally outside any control.  
 
Up to 2002 amount of transfers by districts was a result of some personal dealings 
b
consequences. Absence of virtually any standards and norms in education again 
played very important role in possibility of such private dealings. Starting from 2002 
Ministry of Finance allocates transfers according to formula especially devised for 
more equitable distribution of resources free of any personal profiteering. If this 
brings some positive results remains to be seen – in Georgia today good intentions 
usually pave roads to hell. Besides this formula heavily depends on total amount of 
population – data that even under Georgian conditions is considered extremely 
unreliable.35 Plus education transfer again amounts to more than 75% of total should 
be based on amount of school age population, rather than total. 
 
Chart 6. Role of Transfer in Region Education Expenditures
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ve-mentioned transfers of this kind play strictly negative role, 
mply discouraging local governments from improving mobilization of their own 
                                                
 
In addition to all the abo
si
resources. They are disbursed notwithstanding the actual performance of sector they 
are intended for. It looks like that they are mostly applied as policy instruments in 
relations between federal and local governments. Of course they to a large extent 
 
35 2002 census data is not available even today and definitely by time of calculating transfers only 
available population data was based on adjusted 1989 census results. Considering magnitude and 
intensivity of primarily uncontrolled and unregistered population movement since then any such 
calculation may come close to actual numbers only by chance. 
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reduce formal budget independence of local governments, but also work the other 
way being used as potent instruments in actual power sharing between centre and 
regions.36 
 
This kind of transfer naturally strongly discourages local governments from 
tionalizing public school system too. More schools, more teachers – more transfers, 
Local budget total and per student school education expenditures  
 by regions in 2001-2002 academic year 
egions 
Expenditures  
e
expenditures 
average) 
Student/ 
teacher 
Per school 
expenditures 
Student/ 
school 
ra
especially if district is very weak economically and its finances in disarray. Data in 
Table 1 and charts 5 and 6 provide some information on interdependencies among 
school education variables. For instance there is rather high positive correlation 
(0,597) between education expenditures within transfers and per student education 
expenditures, i.e. more transfer you receive better off are financially students in your 
particular administrative unit.37 Even higher are correlated (0,785) total expenditures 
within transfers and share of school expenses within all local expenses. Again – 
school education plays decisive role in transfer arrangements and is in turn allocated 
the lion’s share of unearned money. In this case instead of performing equalizing role 
they are formally entitled to, transfers do something opposite – providing inequality. 
Better performing administrative units are factually punished, while those lagging 
behind can rely on this system to give them some relief using public school system as 
a pretext. It’s only natural that local governments (excluding the capital quite 
naturally) fight claw and tooth to preserve school education as it is, without any 
changes.  
 
Table: 1.  
 
 
R School Per student Per student  
(% of all 
expenditures) 
xpenditures 
(Lari) 
(  % of 
 national 
ratio ratio 
       
Abkhazeti 11,3 113.2 - 25500.0 120,2 97.6 
Adjara 8  145.1 125.1 11,8 24745,0 170,6 ,9
Tbilisi 11,4 108,2 93,3 14,9 78876,3 728,5 
Kakheti 36.4 94,8 81,7 10,0 23321,6 245,8 
Imereti 39,4 114,9 99,1 10,3 23920,6 208,1** 
Samegrelo 39,8 126,0 108,6 9,7 14434,4 161,1 
Shida Kartli 41,1 81,7 70,4 11,5 17294,4 211,6 
Kvemo Kartli 246,0** 37,8 108,9 93,9 11,6 26782,1 
Guria 48,1 137,5 118,5 9,7 19478,8 141,6 
Samtskhe-
Javakheti 
58,2 146,3 126,1 9,3 22587,9 154,4 
Mtskheta-
Mtianeti 
32,0 141,0 121,5 9,7 14434,4 102,4 
Racha-
Lechkhumi 
42,0 255,6 220,3 5,3 14330,6 56,1 
Total 19,9 116,0 100,0 11,2* 25525,6 220,1 
                                                 
36 There are special transfers used to offset losses suffered by districts through not collecting a land tax. 
Such transfer is applied for instance to Marneuli district where climatic and soil conditions allow for 
three harvests per year and which is quietly getting rich serving Tbilisi agricultural markets. 
37 Of course this does not mean that they are provided higher quality education services. 
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Source:  Ministry of Ed inis inance,  t an Education eali  
            and Strenghtening Project 
n that is adamantly 
gainst any change of existing status and rationalization of school system. Even to 
her strengthen this attitude fighting 
 preserve their however meagre but guaranteed income that is rather rare in Georgia, 
side the capital and few other localities public school 
stem badly needs restructuring (see Charts 6.1 and 6.2, Table 1). According to the 
ool 
ducation.  By order of MoE #305 June 21, 1996 minimum amount of students per 
entioned above a maximum amount of students per 
lass should be – I grade – 25, II-IX- 35, X-XI- 30. In specific cases (especially 
ucation, M try of F he WB Georgi  System R gnment
  
* Student-teacher ratio and per class expenditures calculated without Kazbegi, Martvili and Tianeti 
    districts’ data 
** Local regional centers -Rustavi – 699,2 students per school, Kutaisi – 560,6 
 
Their activity is strongly supported by the prevailing public opinio
a
speak out for support of any measure that may lead to some contraction of the system 
may cost career for politician or state functionary of any rank or affiliation. Even 
some opposition leaders usually outspoken become uncharacteristically mild and 
vague speaking about changes in a school system. 
  
Rather well organized school sector employees fart
to
especially outside the capital and a couple more development centres. Considering 
that local education employees (about 110 thousand) constitute exactly ¼ of all state 
employees and are the largest single remaining group, their collective voice sounds 
very loud. Besides especially in small districts teachers with people they are able to 
influence (family members, parents) constitute too important part of electorate to be 
confronted. President of Georgia went as far as to proclaim public school system 
“inviolable” to any reductions in his election program back in 2000. Part of political 
opposition at the eve of parliamentary elections in November 2003 started to form 
alliances with schoolteachers’ trade unions aimed at preservation and maximization of 
amount of teachers’ work places apparently in exchange for political support 
(although this is not voiced). 
 
On the other hand again out
sy
latest findings of the WB education program in Georgia out of more than 3100 
schools only 1400 have more than 100 students. Majority of schools in the country 
are so small that defy any economic and managerial logic. Student-teacher ration 
often even does not deserve a comment, sometimes in smaller schools being 1/1.  
 
Such situation is formally legalized by existing legal and normative acts on sch
e
school – elementary – 6, basic - 56 and secondary - 76. Logic behind such decision is 
hard to understand. This attitude is farther strengthened by law of development of 
mountainous territories, which states that in mountainous settlements elementary 
school may be opened if there are at least 3 applicants, basic school – 6 and secondary  
school – 21 applicants. Considering that villages are included into special list defining 
their “mountainous” status more by default rather than according to some objective 
criteria, this law turns into a potent tool to preserve inefficient school organization in 
a majority of Georgian regions. 
 
Also according to order #305 m
c
village schools) minimum amount of pupils per class may be 10.  Order #277 of June 
12, 1996. Paragraph 4 – opening of below the standard classes is at discretion of local 
governments. All this pinpoints only one thing – local governments have a legal 
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option to open and maintain schools and classes of any size they see fit, disregarding 
all other considerations. Whether this makes any economic or managerial sense – that 
does not matter. They also are able to preserve as many teachers as they like – order 
#276 of June 12, 1996 just does not “allow full time teachers with load less than 0,5 
of the standard”, meaning at the same time that any school principals able to keep 
officially 2 teachers per post if he/she so wishes. 
 
Unfinished devolution also works in the same direction. Schools formally belong to 
nd are financed by local governments. At the same time Ministry of Education a
retains right to open/close schools and to appoint/dismiss school principals. In reality  
 
Chart 6.1. Structure of the Georgian Public School 
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Chart 6.2. Structure of the Georgian Public School 
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Source: The WB Georgian Education System Realignment and Strengthening Project 
 
though the Ministry can do little to contradict local governments, which usually reach 
results they like without formally being responsible for them. 
 
There is also a rather enigmatic situation with per student financial allocation on 
regional and district levels. As it was mentioned numerous times elsewhere in this text 
since 90% of financial allocations for schools goes to salaries, while rules and 
standards are the same for the whole Georgia, theoretically at least per student 
allocations should not vary to a great extent. In reality regional differences are rather 
impressive. And again the better performing administrative units are “punished” (see 
Table 1). The capital receives per student allocations below the national average, 
while may be the worst performing Racha gets more than twice that much.38 For 
instance students in Oni district (Racha region) receive at least three times more 
allocation than students in Gori (Shida Kartli). Reason of such difference is hard to 
find – at least I could not get any definite answer from any of numerous experts or 
ideration, but 
t least partly it might be explained by the obvious difference in structure of public 
 again the least  
officials I’ve consulted.39 This problem calls for a further detailed cons
a
school systems among districts and regions (see Charts 8.1. and 8.2. on structures of 
public school systems in districts under consideration). It looks
 
 
Chart 7. Local Budget Per-Student Education Expenditures by Regions  
(academic year 2000-2001) 
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38 Adjara naturally does not count since it retains all taxes collected on site. 
39 As I suspect they were hardly aware of this fact. 
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Chart 8.1. Comparative Structure of Public School Systems in Districts with 
Highest and Lowest Per-Student Allocations 
 
 
Source: The WB Georgian Education System Reali ment and Strengthening Project  gn
 
 
 
efficient is the sys e the chances for 
attracting the additional finances, especially central budget transfers (correlation 
between per-student/per-school expenditures is –0,270). Of course ability of local 
officials to establish “correct” contacts with the MoF may also play the decisive role. 
 
All this together leads to a situation that may be called “unhealthy”, if not often 
altogether corrupt. Especially smaller districts are sometimes going too far to preserve 
formal amount of students enrolled in schools and thus the very schools and teachers 
employed there. There is persistent talk about registering the same students into two 
or more schools, opening appropriate classes on September 1 and than removing these 
papers using some convenient pretext. Actual amount of public school sector 
employees is also one of great mysteries of Georgian education. Information varies 
from reporting agency to agency and from year to year to such extent that leaves 
observer puzzled. While larger urban centres where student/teacher ratio is more or 
less acceptable and number of school personnel is either relatively stable or reducing, 
in quite many smaller districts it looks like growing sometimes in extent of 15-20% 
ll these only adds to financial and managerial inefficiency of school system but is 
ardly fought – MoE is actually unable to intervene, local governments are parties the 
ost interested to preserve it as it is today. Public control is virtually absent. Thus any 
 
                                              
 
 
tem, more small schools it contains, more ar
per year or even more.40 
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rationalization in school education even where it’s most obviously needed is very hard 
to implement. Besides, and this is the most important, local school finances are 
abused in a grand manner. As exception, they are simply misappropriated. For 
instance the Chairmen of Tbilisi City Council during his February 2002 discussion on
  
40
 
 If one may take for granted information on amount of teaching posts provided by the MoF. 
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Rustavi 2 TV channel said that at least half of funds earmarked for education in the 
capital in 2002 were “stolen”, but this is at least 1/6 of all Georgian education budget. 
On the other hand, local experts whom I consulted on the subject suppose that the 
majority of school money is “redirected” in a manner as it is usually done with 
pensions. At least 90% of this money is intended for salaries, which is disbursed in a 
form of cash (paper bills actually), since the local banking system is undeveloped and 
besides schools have no bank accounts at all. Local authorities use this money 
 
Chart 8.2. Comparative Structure of Public School Systems in Districts with 
Highest and Lowest Per-Student Allocations 
 
 
 
 
Source: The WB Georgian Education System Reali ment and Strengthening Project  
 
(especially when it inessmen at rates 
wer than the formal bank rates. These last use it for highly profitable, quick 
ansactions – to buy and resale for instance cigarettes, alcohol, petrol and like.41 
Sometimes such operations are successful and money goes back to school with 
relatively short delay, sometimes they are not, or locals simply decide to keep the 
money and schools are deprived of salaries. Again there is hardly any control – formal 
or other. Local governments are even legally outside the control – no one is by law 
able to interfere into their budgeting or spending processes. Not that this is bad on 
principle – the process of decentralization is aimed on establishment of unimpeded 
local responsibility. Problem is that local governments in Georgia, especially on the 
basic, district level are still half-cooked, very weak structures. Their status has been 
reconsidered at least three times during last few years and in the current form they are 
virtually impotent, organized in a way which allow them to make decisions only if 
these suit president’s local appointees (at least this happens in the vast majority of 
cases). Besides more often than not these governments are controlled by local 
strongmen and the last local elections (in 2002) may serve as a classic example of 
how they should not be organized. Council of Europe in its evaluation of these 
lections went as far as to warn Georgian authorities that if forthcoming parliamentary 
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41 The same happens with pensions – but on the federal level. It looks like that we observe some kind 
 
of division of labour between federal and local authorities. 
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elections would in any way resemble the local one, Georgia would be suspended from 
s directly tied to fate of school. If school 
goes village goes too. At least sharp drop in birth rate and intensified out-
conservative estimations is needed to 
stab z
Any r
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degene
redistribute rights and responsibilities, redefine priorities but not to improve overall 
fina i
 
From s
prospe
macroe
turn th evelopment and legalizing the 
ystem based on private contributions. Still there is a question of public acceptance of 
1. Corruption inside the public school system in Georgia, as compared with the 
overall situation in the country, is more than tolerable and rather mild. 
this organization (sic!). Thus there are little chances that school finances are used in 
some orderly way, at least in the near future. 
 
Logically the best way to curb the local abuse of education finances is to rationalize 
school system thus reducing financial base for such activities and to make control 
easier taking care of numerous, extremely small village schools. But there are 
questions of social costs and actual financial gains of such rationalization (if any).  All 
local experts I talked to agree that closure of schools in villages would almost 
certainly lead to the following consequences: 
• Majority of children (especially of younger age groups) will cease to attend 
school at all. However small this number of dropouts may be compared to 
total in the country this is a cost society is not ready to accept. Arranging 
transportation for such children is so costly that it’s cheaper to maintain school 
with up to 15 teachers than one school bus (even disregarding its purchase 
expenses). Boarding schools are also not the option based on the same 
considerations, besides they are notoriously mismanaged and poorly 
organized; 
• For majority of rural settlements schools perform very important unifying 
function. Today, when almost all other functions are gone, social life in 
villages concentrates around school that represent some island of stability 
during troubled times. Fate of village i
migration of younger population are observed.  
 
Besides the actual economy that may be achieved this way would be too small to in 
actual numbers to lead to any real positive results. This is a fact often overlooked by 
the majority of observers – total public school expenditures accounted to about $ 40 
mill in 2001. This is less than by the most 
ili e and provide some development impetus for school system only in the capital. 
ationalization process will gain too little in financial terms to improve 
rably overall situation in the system. May be the only rather easily acceptable 
plementable measure that will provide visible financial gains is increasing per 
 weekly load by ¼, measure that is strongly recommended by the majority of 
. All other rationalization measures are necessary to curb a general process of 
ration of a school system and introduce some kind of order and discipline, 
nc al provision. 
tandpoint of decisive improvement of financial provision of school system 
cts are rather gloomy. Resources available for government both on 
conomic as well as ministerial and local governments’ levels are too small to 
e tide. This leaves the only option available – d
s
such measure. 
 
4. Here are the most general conclusions from analysis provided above: 
Although the actual amount of people participating in the process is rather 
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t least this invariably happened till up today).  As to rewarding 
privately teachers for services provided, this practice is so deeply ingrained in 
ent level is much more serious and dangerous for schools. But this 
problem is mainly created and exists outside the school system proper. 
ces since this 
 
 
  
 
 
high, amount of money that can be misappropriated on principle looks rather 
small, even if we consider that all contributions are illegally disbursed. Such 
possible causes of corruption as exemplified in private contributions and 
above the curricula instructions can be easily taken under control provided that 
some clear, simple and transparent rules of conduct are introduced. The 
difficult part is in who is going to control this process. In the absence of civil 
society the public control is virtually absent and will hardly be present in the 
short to medium run. Any formal controlling organization in Georgia in turn 
simply ends up requesting a cut in illegal profits and encourages them instead 
of curbing (a
the local social customs that start to actively fight it today will hardly bring 
any positive result. Besides again the actual scope of this process (especially 
outside the capital) is strictly limited due to the obvious insolvency of 
population and loss of interest in education. 
2. Problem of misappropriation of funds earmarked for schools on the local 
governm
Schools in this case are just used as a pretext to abuse local finan
system is virtually the only one functioning on the local level, deserving (and 
requesting) proper financing.  How to fight this is hard to say on this stage of 
research, especially considering that such problem is outside the framework of 
this investigation and properly belongs to domain of structural reforms, 
namely local government reform process. I also consider that development 
options aimed at setting up a foundation to fight this type of corruption cannot 
be realistically implemented in the current economic and political setting. On 
the other hand due mainly to this problem public school system is may be 
deliberately left in its very inefficient form which provides local governments 
with opportunity to apply for and acquire extra finances they do not actually 
deserve. This part of problem needs the extra attention, since leaving the 
situation as it is today may create plenty of additional, unnecessary problems 
for already weakened public school system. 
